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NOTES AND COMMENTS
California's New Campaign Finance Law: Is
Section 85303(c) the Life of the Party?
INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1988, Californians voted to enact Proposition 73, a
reform measure that amended the state's campaign finance law to
provide for less expensive, fairer, and more egalitarian elections.'
California's Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) has the
responsibility of writing regulations to clarify the new law's am-
biguous sections.
Section 85303(c)2 of Proposition 73 and its corresponding regu-
lations are of particular interest to California's political parties
and candidates. This new section is a blessing for the state's politi-
cal parties, but a curse for the state's political reformers. The sec-
tion provides a mechanism that can be used to rebuild the influ-
ence of California's weak political parties, but it also contains a
"soft money' 3 loophole that allows big contributors to circumvent
the new contribution limits and violate the spirit of campaign fi-
nance reform.
The FPPC properly interpreted Section 85303(c) to allow polit-
ical parties to raise unlimited funds for certain activities that are
important to the health of California's political system. These ac-
tivities include voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote pro-
grams. However, this Comment will argue that the FPPC should
take further steps to limit the abuse of this section by closing the
''soft money" loophole.
Section One of this Comment will briefly discuss the history of
California's state election laws and the problems that gave rise to
1. Proposition 73 was formally titled the "Campaign Contribution Limits Without
Taxpayer Financing Amendments to the Political Reform Act."
2. Section 85303(c): "Nothing in this Chapter shall limit a person's ability to provide
financial or other support to one or more political committees or broad based political com-
mittees provided the support is used for purposes other than making contributions directly
to candidates for elective office."
3. Soft money is a political term of art which refers to the infusion of indirect cam-
paign funds that directly benefit candidates. The money is "soft" because it is either be-
yond the law's contribution limits or beyond the law's disclosure requirements.
1
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Proposition 73. In Section Two, some basic elements of the new
law will be highlighted and compared with parallel provisions in
federal law. In Section Three, Section 85303 (c) will be analyzed
in light of its impact on the state's political parties. Finally, in
Section Four, this Comment will offer suggestions for future
FPPC regulations that can be used to limit the danger of "soft
money " abuse.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF CALIFORNIA CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM
A. Introduction
When California voters passed Proposition 73 on June 7, 1988,
they also passed Proposition 68, a competing campaign reform
measure. Both propositions won by a substantial margin.4 The
success of these initiatives reflected the voters' desire to bring re-
form to the state's campaign finance system. At one time, Califor-
nia was a progressive leader among the states in attempting to
check the corrupting influence of money in politics. However, by
1988, California's state campaign finance laws were considered
some of the most lax in the nation. 5 Before examining section
85303(c) in detail, it is helpful to see where Proposition 73 fits in
the historical context of campaign finance reform.
B. Historical Scope: Money and Influence
It was a California legislator who was credited with coining the
political axiom, "Money is the mother's milk of politics."'6 Pro-
position 73 was the newest attempt at limiting and monitoring po-
litical money, but reform of this type is not a new concept. In fact,
it is simply another step in the historical struggle to limit the cor-
rupting influence of accumulated wealth upon government. Money
is not a new tool in the world f politics; its influence has been felt
in every system and in every generation.7
4. Proposition 73 received a 58% vote for approval and Proposition 68 received a
53% vote for approval.
5. "Until the [June 1988] election, California had one of the most permissive state
election laws in the country. There was no prohibition of direct corporate or labor contribu-
tions. Not even the most commonplace state provision, such as contribution limits, ap-
plied." Alexander, Initiatives in California Muddle Political Finance, IMPACT: THE PUBLIC
AFFAIRS COUNCIL NEWSLETTER, July/Aug. 1988, p.3.
6. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS, Forward (1976).
7. The Mosaic Law of ancient Israel contained specific statutes prohibiting the brib-
ery of Hebrew judges and officers; see Deuteronomy 16:19. One author, noting the venal
character of ancient Roman political leaders, said, "a little straightforward bribery was no
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The Watergate scandal reminded Americans that money still
exercised a great influence on the nation's politics. For example,
the dairy industry was alleged to have pledged $2 million to Presi-
dent Nixon's re-election campaign in exchange for the administra-
tion's support of increase in prices and subsidies for the industry.'
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this problem when it
wrote:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a polit-
ical quid pro quo9 from current and potential office holders, the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is under-
mined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can
never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples
surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem
is not an illusory one. 0
Money's long history of influence in politics has served to under-
mine many citizens' faith in the ability of our government to func-
tion properly.'
C. California's Campaign Finance History
1. Early Reform Efforts
California, at one time, was a leader among the states in cam-
paign finance reform. In 1893, fourteen years before the first fed-
eral campaign finance reform laws were enacted, 12 California
adopted the Purity of Elections Law.'" The law required campaign
Prior to 1760, the most durable and powerful First Minister in the 18th century govern-
ment of England had been Sir Robert Walpole (1721-1742), who build his loyal following
in and out of the parliament through election manipulation, bribery, and the use of pa-
tronage, sinecures, titles, and other forms of political preferment. See J. MARTIN, IN THE
COURSE OF HUMAN EVENTS 27 (1979).
John F. Kennedy, in his book Profiles of Courage, 54-55 (1957), refers to then-Massa-
chusetts Senator Daniel Webster as the most talented figure in our congressional history,
yet notes that Webster could see nothing improper about writing to the President of the
Bank of the United States, at the time the Senate was debating the renewal of the Bank's
charter, and mentioning that his "retainer" had not been received or refreshed as usual.
8. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION 468-500 (1976).
9. A quid pro quo is "something for something. Used in law for the giving one
valuable thing for another." BLACKS'S LAW DICTIONARY 651 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983).
10. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
II. According to a Los Angeles Times Poll, Californians who voted for both Proposi-
tion 68 and Proposition 73 believed that special-interest money had been "corrupting the
state legislature." Los Angeles Times, June 9, 1988, at A-l, col. 1.
12. The first federal campaign finance reform laws were enacted in response to the
public outcry excited by the "muckrakers" who exposed the improper influence that big
business exerted upon government by means of unrestrained spending on behalf of certain
candidates. In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, which made it unlawful for a corpo-
ration or national bank to make a "money contribution in connection with any election" of
candidates for federal office. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESS AND THE
NATION, VOL. IV 986 (1985).
13. Comment, Campaign Contributions and Expenditures in California, 41 CALIF.
1990]
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"committees" to file reports of contributions and expenditures.1 4
The law also set expenditure limits and prohibited expenditures by
persons other than the candidate and the authorized committee.'"
The 1893 law was formally repealed 6 in 1907 when the legisla-
ture passed a new law that had exlenditure limits and reporting
requirements similar to the 1893 law, but lacked the stiffer en-
forcement provision of the earlier law.'" In 1913, another law was
passed which attempted to restrict primary expenditures and to
impose limited primary reporting requirements. 8 The 1907 and
1913 laws, along with minor amendments, were codified in 1938
in the California Election Code.' 9 The expenditure limits were de-
leted in 1949.20
2. Recent Reform Efforts
California continued its attempt to reform its campaign finance
system when the legislature enacted the Waxman-Dymally Cam-
paign Disclosure Act,2' which emphasized full campaign finance
disclosure. The legislature in this Act, declared, "The people have
a right to expect from their elected representatives at all levels of
government assurances of the utmost in integrity, honesty, and
fairness in their dealings."22
In 1974, California voters approved Proposition 9 by an over-
whelming (seventy percent) margin.2 a This initiative was enacted
as the Political Reform Act of 1974.24 The Political Reform Act
focused on (1) continuing the disclosure requirements; 25 (2) re-
stricting incumbent spending; (3) public officials' conflicts of inter-
est;26 (4) lobbyist registration; 27 and (5) the creation of the Fair
Political Practices Commission (FPPC) to monitor and enforce
L. REV. 300, 303 (1953).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. A 1896 case held that the statute did not apply to primary elections. The legisla-
ture attempted to correct this problem with the Purity of Primary Elections Law in 1897.
However, the California Supreme Court declared the law's provision to be unconstitutional
in 1898. Id. at 303-04.
17. Id. at 304-05.
18. Id. at 305.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See CAL. ELECT CODE § 11500 (1973).
22. Id. at § 11501(a).
23. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 231.
24. The Political Reform Act of 1974 was passed as Proposition 9 by California
voters in June of 1974. The initiative's elements were codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
81000-91014 (1989).
25. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 84100-84400 (1989).
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE §9 87100-87500 (1989).
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE 9§ 86100-86300 (1989).
[Vol. 26
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the law.28 The people declared that "receipts and expenditures in
election campaigns should be fully and truthfully disclosed in or-
der that the voters may be fully informed and improper practices
may be inhibited ... "'I
Although enacted in the same post-Watergate environment that
spurred Congress to enact the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA),3 0 California's Political Reform Act lacked the federal
law's restraints on contributions and its prohibition against direct
corporate and labor union contributions.31 California focused on
spending limits rather than following the federal example and fo-
cusing on contribution limits.,2
In 1976, California's spending limit restrictions were voided as
a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v.
Valeo.3 3 The Court voided as unconstitutional the FECA's expen-
diture limits that did not include a public financing provision.
3 4
The Court declared that the FECA's spending limits represented
a substantial restraint on the quantity and diversity of political
speech.3 The Court did not find this restraint present when the
expenditure limits were imposed upon candidates who voluntarily
accepted public funds for their campaigns. 6
Thus, Buckley voided, by implication, the California Political
Reform Act's spending limits, since the state limits were not part
of a voluntary public financing scheme. This left California with a
law that had no contribution limits and no expenditure limits. In
other words, a big contributor (known as a "fat cat") could give
unlimited amounts of money to influence a California state elec-
tion. The "fat cat's" chosen candidate could spend unlimited
amounts to defeat his or her opponents. The fear was that the
candidate would then become indebted to the fat cat for a post-
election quid pro quo.
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 83100-83123 (1989).
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81002(a) (1989).
30. Congress approved the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1971 which
imposed contribution and expenditure limits. The new law also required full disclosure of
all contributions and expenditures. However, the FECA was not fully strengthened until
1974 when Congress added extensive amendments. Congress clarified and refined the
FECA with amendments in 1976, 1977, and 1979. Perhaps the most important of the 1974
amendments was the creation of the Federal Election Commission, an independent regula-
tory agency charged with monitoring and enforcing the new campaign finance laws.
31. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1986).
32. "Contribution" limits focus on how much money a committee can legally receive
from a contributor. "Spending" limits focus on how much money a committee can expend
to influence a campaign.
33. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
34. Id. at 143.
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 109.
1990]
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3. The Weakness of the Political Parties
The Democratic and Republican party- organizations were not
the true "power brokers" in California's freewheeling system of
unlimited giving and unlimited spending. The parties' traditional
functions of raising money and selecting candidates had been
taken over by particular groups who were tapped into the flow of
millions of dollars of political money. The power vacuum that
should have been filled by the political parties was filled by corpo-
rations, unions, and leaders in the State Senate and State
Assembly.
California's political party system has been considered one of
the weakest in the nation. This weakness was attributable in part
to the fact that, until recently, California parties were prohibited
from endorsing candidates in the primaries. 37 Parties were no
longer needed to raise funds or to help execute campaigns. Candi-
dates became less dependent on parties and more dependent upon
paid campaign specialists. Without pre-primary party support,
California candidates looked to special interest groups to raise
funds.38
Corporate and union leaders were influential because they could
contribute unlimited amounts of money directly from their organi-
zation treasuries. They did not have to solicit "voluntary" contri-
butions from their employees or members. By 1984, most states
had followed the federal theory and prohibited direct contribu-
tions from corporate and labor treasuries. But California allowed
unlimited direct corporate and labor union contributions.39 Corpo-
rate and union money that could not be contributed in most other
states, or contributed in federal elections, still flowed freely in
California. With corporations and unions actively involved in the
process, candidates did not need to look first to their parties for
financial support.
The corporate and union contributions were often given directly
to the caucus leaders and committee chairmen in the State As-
sembly and State Senate. These legislators were usually incum-
bent candidates in safe seats who used their money surplus to
elect other Assembly and Senate members loyal to them. These
legislative leaders controlled the flow of political money to poten-
tial candidates, and therefore controlled the candidate selection
37. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, - U.S.
109 S. Ct. 1013 (1989).
38. Alexander & Fay, What the New Year Brings for Political Campaigning, Los
Angeles Herald Examiner, Jan. 3, 1989, at A-I1, col. 1.
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process, a role traditionally left to the party organizations."' Pro-
position 73 was in part a response to the perceived danger of hav-
ing a system in which Legislature leaders exercised too much con-
trol on the electoral process.4
In passing Proposition 9 in 1974, the people of California de-
clared that "[Closts of conducting election campaigns have in-
creased greatly in recent years, and candidates have been forced
to finance their campaigns by seeking large contributions from
lobbyists and organizations who thereby gain disproportionate in-
fluence over governmental decisions. "42
4. The Need for Further Reform
Although California had once been a leader in tough campaign
reform, by 1988 it was considered one of the most permissive
states. California's lack of contribution limits or spending limits
may have been the main reason why California legislative elec-
tions were among the most expensive in the nation.43 By 1988,
lawmakers, lobbyists, and public interest groups were looking for
a solution to California's campaign finance problem, which had
manifested itself in skyrocketing campaign costs and the inordi-
nate legislative influence of well-funded special interest groups.
II. CALIFORNIA'S 1988 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
INITIATIVES
A. The Provisions of Proposition 73 are Implemented
In 1988, California voters were offered potential solutions to the
state's campaign financing problem. They were given two choices
to reform the state's campaign finance laws. Propositions 68 and
73 were both designed to correct some of the perceived abuses in
the system.4 4 Proposition 73 was more limited in scope than Pro-
position 68 and, therefore, received greater support among politi-
40. Assembly and Senate leaders were influential in party decision making, but they
often were not true "leaders" of the parties because they sacrificed party unity to build
their own cadre of loyalists. For example, an Assembly "turf war" over a key leadership
post (e.g. Speaker of the Assembly) would involve two warring Assembly leaders of the
same party giving money to opposing candidates of the same party in a district's primary.
If eventually elected, the primary winner advanced to Sacramento already indebted to the
legislative baron who gave him money.
41. Alexander & Fay, supra note 38.
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81001(C) (1989).
43. Id.
44. Proposition 68 was designed to set limits on contributions and expenditures; allow
for partial public financing; ban the transfers between candidates; prohibit off-year fun-
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cal office holders of both major parties. The proposition was au-
thored by Assemblyman Ross Johnson (Republican), State
Senator Joseph Montoya (Democrat), and State Senator Quentin
Kopp (Independent)."
Both initiatives were approved by the voters. Since Proposition
73 received more votes than Proposition 68, the provisions of Pro-
position 73 should control in situations of conflict.,6 The FPPC
has ruled that Proposition 73 voided all but a few administrative
and disclosure elements of Proposition 68.
B. In Many Ways, Proposition 73 Paralleled the Federal
Election Campaign Act
Proposition 73 was a significant victory for California's cam-
paign finance reformers because the new law adopted the federal
scheme of imposing limits on contributions to candidates, commit-
tees, and political parties. 48 Although Proposition 73 only applies
to state and local candidates, and the FECA only applies to fed-
eral candidates, the two laws are parallel in many ways.
For example, federal law limits contributions from a "person"
to a candidate to $1,000 per election.4 9 Proposition 73 limits con-
tributions from a "person" to a candidate of $1,000 per fiscal
year. While the FECA prohibits all contributions from corpora-
tions and labor organizations to federal candidates, ° the new Cal-
ifornia law allows corporations and labor organizations to contrib-
ute as "persons" to state and local candidates.51
Under the FECA, a "person" can give up to $20,000 per year
to a national party committee and $5,000 per year to any other
political committee. 2 Under Proposition 73, a "person" can give
up to $2,500 per fiscal year to a political party committee, broad
based political committee, or political party committee.5"
Federal law allows political committees to give candidates
$1,000 per election and "multi-candidate political committees" to
45. Johnson represents the 64th assembly district (Orange County). Montoya repre-
sented the 26th senatorial district (Los Angeles County). Kopp represents the 8th senato-
rial district (San Francisco).
46. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(b).
47. In re Bell, FPPC Opinion 88-002 (Nov. 1988). See also Taxpayers to Limit
Campaign Spending v. FPPC, No. B039177 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989); Service Em-
ployees International Union v. FPPC, No. CIVS-89-0433 (E.D. Ca. 1989).
48. Proposition 73 does not prevent local jurisdictions from setting contribution lin-
its lower than those required under state law. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85101 (1989).
49. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(A) (1986).
50. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1986).
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82047 (1989).
52. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(B); 441a(a)(1)(C) (1986).
53. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 85302 (1989).
[Vol. 26
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give candidates $5,000 per election.5 4 Under Proposition 73, a po-
litical committee with at least two contributors can give $2,500 to
a candidate per fiscal year. A "broad based political committee"
can give $5,000 to a candidate per fiscal year.55
Under federal law, a national political party can contribute up
to $5,000 directly to its candidates,56 and can also make "coordi-
nated expenditures" on behalf of that candidate based upon a slid-
ing scale indexed to the cost of living and the voting age popula-
tion.57 Under Proposition 73, political parties may not give more
than $5,000 per fiscal year in direct contributions to a candidate. 58
Proposition 73 also limits the amount of honoraria an elected
officeholder can receive from a single source;5 9 prohibits transfers
between candidate controlled committees;60 and prohibits state
and local elected officials from spending public funds on newslet-
ters and mass mailings."1 It also prohibits public financing 62 and,
therefore, spending limits.63 Proposition 73 and those elements of
Proposition 68 not in conflict were codified at Title 9, Chapter 5,
of the California Government Code.
C. The Role of the Fair Political Practice Commission
California's Fair Political Practice Commission has primary re-
sponsibility for the impartial and effective administration and im-
plementation of the election laws codified in Title 9 of the Califor-
nia Government Code.64 The Commission has the authority to
adopt, amend, and rescind rules and regulations to carry out the
purposes and provisions of this title. 65 This includes the authority
to issue regulations that define terms in the statute.6 6 In this re-
spect, the FPPC has the same function with regard to state law as
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) does to federal election
laws." In 1989, after receiving many requests for guidance 8 from
54. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A); 441a(a)(2)(A); and § 441a(a)(4) (1986).
55. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85303(b) (1989).
56. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1986).
57. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1986).
58. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 85303 (b) (1989).
59. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85400 (1989).
60. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85202 (1989).
61. CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 82041.5; 89001 (1989).
62. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85300 (1989).
63. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that expenditure limits without public financing
were unconstitutional. Therefore, supporters of Proposition 73 defeated expenditure limits
by defeating public financing. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 83111 (1989).
65. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 83112 (1989).
66. See, 2 CAL CODE OF REGS. §§ 18202-18249.
67. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(8) (1986).
68. For example, see the following FPPC Request for Advice Letters: Letter to Ken
1990]
9
Baber: California's New Campaign Finance Law: Is Section 85303(c) the Li
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
434 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
the public, the FPPC enacted regulations designed to clarify the
ambiguous portions of section 85303(c). 9
III. INTERPRETING PROPOSITION 73's SECTION 85303(c)
A. Introduction
Proposition 73 significantly departs from prior California law
by establishing a limit ($2,500 per fiscal year) on the amount of'
money a person can contribute to a state political committee or
state political party. However, the new law also includes an excep-
tion to this limit. The initiative's section 85303(c) reads, "Nothing
in this Chapter shall limit a person's ability to provide financial or
other support to one or more political committees or broad based
political committees provided the support is used for purposes
other than making contributions directly to candidates for elec-
tive office." [Emphasis added.]
Section 85303(c) does not specifically mention political parties.
However, the FPPC has interpreted this section to include politi-
cal party organizations that receive at least $1,000.00 in contribu-
tions in a calendar year.70 The political party becomes a "political
committee" when it receives contributions from two or more per-
sons and makes contributions to candidates. It becomes a "broad
based political committee" when it has been in existence for more
than six months, received contributions from one hundred or more
persons, and makes contributions to five or more candidates.72 For
example, the Republican and Democratic parties each have state
central committees that are broad based political committees.
In interpreting the impact of Section 85303(c) on political party
committees, the FPPC was faced with some difficult questions.
First, if a person gives 85303(c) "financial or other support" to a
political party committee, has that person made a "contribution"
to that committee? If it is a contribution, is it restricted by the
law's contribution limits? Secondly, in what ways can a party
Calvert & Ethel M. Silver (A-89-403) (July 18, 1989); Letter to Peter Bagatelos (1-89-
327) (July 18, 1989); Letter to John S. Eldred (A-89-038) (July 27, 1989); Letter to
Teresa Cragie (A-89-236) (July 27, 1989); Letter to Charles H. Bell, Jr. (A-89-432)
(Aug. 21, 1989); and Letter to Emery Dowell (A-89-566) (Nov. 7, 1989).
69. See 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. §§ 18215 (as amended), 18531 (as amended), 18535;
and 18539.
70. The Political Reform Act contains no definition of "political party." However,
Government Code section 82013(a) defines "committee" as any combination of persons
who receive contributions totalling $1,000 or more in a calendar year. Since political par-
ties receive this threshold amount of contributions, they are committees for purposes of the
Political Reform Act. FPPC Initial Statement of Reasons re Adoption of 2 Cal. Code of
Regs, Sec. 18539.
71. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85102 (c).
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85102 (d).
[Vol. 26
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committee spend the 85303(c) funds? In other words, what are
"'purposes other than making contributions directly to
candidates"?
B. Interpreting "Financial or Other Support"
1. Are Section 85303(c) Funds Contributions?
What is the legal status of money given to a political committee
under section 85303(c)? California Government Code section
82015 defines a "contribution," in part, as "a payment, a forgive-
ness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a third party, or an enforce-
able promise to make a payment except to the extent that full and
adequate consideration is received unless it is clear from the sur-
rounding circumstances that it is not made for political pur-
poses." 73 In other words, money given for a "political purpose"
that is not exchanged for fair consideration (such as payment for
a voter mailing list) is a contribution to the recipient. A "political
purpose" includes "influencing or attempting to influence the ac-
tion of the voters for or against the nomination or election of a
candidate or candidates, or the qualification or passage of any
measure."
74
The "Analysis by the Legislative Analyst" published in the Cal-
ifornia 1988 primary ballot pamphlet 75 explained that:
The personal contribution limits only apply to financial or other
support provided to a political committee or broad-based politi-
cal committee if the support is used for making contributions
directly to a candidate. The contribution limits do not apply if
the contributions are used by the committee for other purposes,
such as administrative costs.
This analysis reflects, in a limited way, part of the "intent" be-
hind section 85303(c). Based upon this analysis, and the defini-
tions in place before the enactment of Proposition 73, the FPPC
determined that section 85303(c) payments to political commit-
tees were "contributions" that were not governed by the section
85302 contribution limits.
76
The FPPC decision to consider 85303(c) funds as contribu-
tions"7 7 was probably aimed more at defending the state's disclos-
73. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82015 (1989).
74. 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18215(a)(1).
75. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, Primary Election June 7, 1988, at 14.
76. 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18535 (a).
77. There are at least three ways to argue that Proposition 73 was never intended to
include Section 85303(c) funds within the definition of "contributions." First, if the draft-
ers had meant to use the word "contribution," then there would be no logical reason for
including section 85303(c) in the initiative. The words "Nothing in this chapter shall limit
a person's ability to provide..." specifically distinguishes the money given under section
1990]
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ure rules than its new contribution limits. Proposition 73 was in-
corporated into the existing Title 9 of the California Government
Code. One of the purposes of Title 9 is to insure that "[r]eceipts
and expenditures in election campaigns should be fully and truth-
fully disclosed in order that the voters may be fully informed and
improper practices may be inhibited. ' 78 In the absence of specific
legislative language to the contrary, it is reasonable to infer that
Proposition 73's provisions are within the letter and spirit of this
purpose. Therefore, the section 85303(c) funds should be reporta-
ble as "contributions" by political party committees pursuant to
section 84211.11
2. Hard Money Contributions and Soft Money Contributions
The FPPC decision to define section 85303(c) funds as contri-
butions had the actual effect of creating two distinctly different
types of "contributions" to political party committees.80 Now Cal-
ifornia political party committees can raise and spend "hard
money" contributions and "soft money" contributions. Soft money
is a political term of art that refers to the infusion of indirect
campaign funds that actually benefit candidates. The money is
"soft" because it is either beyond the scope of legal disclosure re-
quirements or because it need not be counted against contribution
limits.8" Soft money is not money raised or spent illegally; it is
money that complies with the letter of the law but violates the
85303(c) from money given under the rest of the provision of the chapter entitled "Limita-
tions on Contributions."
Secondly, the drafters of Proposition 73 used the word "contribution" or "contributions"
twenty-nine other times in the text of the initiative. For example, the word "contribution"
even appears in section 85303(c); i.e., "for purposes other than making contributions di-
rectly to candidates .. ." [emphasis added]. If the drafters of the proposition had wanted to
use the word "contribution", they certainly had it within their vocabulary. The one use of
the phrase "financial or other support" stands in marked contrast to the twenty-nine uses
of the word "contribution(s)."
Thirdly, it is not beyond the scope of the campaign finance law to specifically delineate
certain types of financial support as "non-contributions." For example, in Section 82015
the first $500 spent by an occupant of a home for a fundraising event held in that home is
specifically excepted from the definition of "contribution." That section also states that
volunteer personal services or payments of a volunteer's own travel expenses are not
contributions.
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81002(a).
79. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84211 requires that itemized information (e.g. name, ad-
dress, occupation) about contributors above $100 (cumulative) be provided on the commit-
tee's campaign finance reports.
80. 2 CAL CODE OF REGS. § 18535 codifies the distinction between a contribution
that is subject to the 85302 limit of $2,500 per fiscal year and a contribution that is not
subject to that limit. In other words, one type of contribution is limited and the other type
of contribution is unlimited.
81. For an overview of "soft money" practices, see generally E. DREW, POLITICS AND
MONEY 12-19 (1983).
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spirit of the law. In this respect, the use of soft money is more a
loophole in the law than a violation of the law. Soft money stands
in contrast with "hard money" that is fully disclosed and fully
limited by election laws.82
The "hard money contributions" are governed by Section 85302
and are collected in amounts of $2,500.00 or less per fiscal year.
83
The party committees turn around and disperse this hard money
to their candidates at election time in the form of direct contribu-
tions. Political party committees that qualify as statutory "politi-
cal committees" can distribute up to $2,500.00 in hard money to
candidates each fiscal year. "Broad based political committees",
like the Republican and Democratic state central committees, can
distribute up to $5,000.00 in hard money to candidates per fiscal
year.84
The "soft money contributions" are governed by section
85303(c) and are collected by party committees in unlimited
amounts. Party committees can spend unlimited amounts of this
soft money for any type of legal activity other than to make con-
tributions directly to candidates. In other words, there are no lim-
its on the amount of soft money that can come in to, or go out
from, a political party committee. The only restriction is that the
money must be raised and spent "for purposes other than making
contributions directly to candidates for elective office." What are
these "purposes"?
C. Interpreting "Purposes Other Than Making Contributions
Directly": Permitted and Prohibited Uses
1. Clearly Prohibited Uses of Section 85303(c) Funds
There are certain activities that are clearly not permissible uses
of section 85303(c) funds. For example, the section prohibits a
party committee from using section 85303(c) funds for direct con-
tributions to candidates for elective office. Direct contributions
would include payments of money given without an exchange of
fair consideration; the forgiveness of a loan; the payment of a can-
82. The term "hard money" is a political term of art that refers to political funds
that must be reported and must not exceed a specified legal limit. For example, a direct,
permissible contribution to a candidate's committee would be considered hard money.
83. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 85302: "No person shall make and no ..... political party
shall solicit or accept, any contribution or loan from a person which would cause the total
amount contributed or loaned by that person to the same. . . political party to exceed two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in any fiscal year to make contributions to candi-
dates for elective office."
84. 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18539 (a)(l) explicitly applies the law's contribution
limits to the state central committees of parties (such as the Republicans and Democrats)
that qualify for participation in state primaries.
1990]
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didate's loan to a third person; an expenditure made at the candi-
date's behest; or transfer of valuable goods and services at less
than fair market value.85
Since section 85301 limits the amount of money a person can
give a candidate to $1,000 in a fiscal year, the contribution limits
would be vitiated if that same persons could give more than
$1,000 to a political party committee that would then directly
contribute those same funds to the candidate. Although it may be
clear what a party committee cannot do with section 85303(c)
funds, it is not so clear what they can do with those funds.
2. Clearly Permitted Uses of Section 85303(c) Funds
Although it is easier to determine what is not a permitted use
under section 85303(c) than what is a permitted use, it is clear
that 85303(c) funds can be used for the party's administrative
costs.88 The party's administrative costs include its salaries, over-
head, building maintenance, and fundraising costs. These are
ongoing day-to-day operations for parties that continue regardless
of the activities or inactivities of candidates. The administration of
a party committee provides no direct contribution to a candidate,
unless the party donates or gives the candidate the benefit of those
services. For example, the party's administrative costs would in-
clude compiling lists of registered voters. The money used by the
party to compile those lists would not be used for making "direct
contributions" to candidates unless those lists were later turned
over to the candidate for his or her personal use.
The party's facility maintenance costs involve the physical
maintenance of its headquarters and other facilities. Section
85303(c) allows contributors to give unlimited amounts of money
to maintain a state party's headquarters. The party's physical
building would not be a direct contribution to a candidate, unless
it used that building to make an in-kind contribution to that can-
didate in the form of free rent.
This parallels the federal law, which allows contributors to give
unlimited amounts of money to a national party committee to "de-
fray any cost incurred for construction or purchase of any office
facility which is not acquired for the purpose of influencing the
election of any candidate in any particular election for federal of-
fice." These "office buildings funds" are not considered federal
"contributions" and they are not subject to federal contribution
85. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82015 (1989).
86. The "Analysis by the Legislative Analyst" published in the June 7, 1988 Califor-
nia 1988 Primary Ballot Pamphlet stated that the contribution limits do not apply if the
contributions received are used by a political committee for administrative costs.
[Vol. 26
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limits. However, these funds are subject to federal disclosure
requirements.81
If party organizations are not allowed to use section 85303(c)
funds for legitimate administrative and maintenance expenses,
this would have a chilling effect on the constitutional rights of as-
sociation of the political parties and their members. The U.S. Su-
preme Court recently held in Eu v. San Francisco County Demo-
cratic Central Committee that "a State cannot justify regulating a
party's internal affairs without showing that such regulation is
necessary to ensure an election that is orderly and fair." 88
D. Interpreting "Purposes Other Than Making Contributions
Directly". Potential Gray Area Uses of Section 85303(c) Funds
1. Introduction
As previously noted, a party committee can not use section
85303(c) funds to directly contribute to candidates. A party com-
mittee can use those funds for its administration costs. However,
between these two black and white extremes lies a considerable
gray area. This gray area will contract or expand as the FPPC
defines "purposes other than making contributions directly to can-
didates for elective office."
There are at least three important political party activities that
fall into this gray area: (1) voter registration efforts; (2) get-out-
the-vote efforts; and (3) generic pro-party advertisements.8 9 A
candidate is not likely to be successful unless he or she has some
system in place for finding and turning out sympathetic voters on
election day.
Voter registration efforts are used by political parties to build
up their potential base of supporters by seeking out and register-
ing likely partisan voters. Before a citizen will vote for a Republi-
can or Democratic candidate, that citizen must be registered. Peo-
ple overwhelmingly go to the polls once registered. The Census
Bureau reported that, in 1984, eighty-eight percent of registrants
reported voting.90
Get-out-the-vote efforts include contacting potential partisan
87. 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(12) (1988).
88. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, - U.S.
109 S. Ct. 1013 (1989).
89. 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18215 (d) states that "voter registration activities or
activities encouraging or assisting persons to vote" that do not specifically name the candi-
date (or opposing candidate) are not "contributions" to that candidate. Since these activi-
ties are not contributions to candidates, they may be funded by 85303(c) funds.
90. Piven & Cloward, National Voter Registration Reform: How it Might be Won,
XXI PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS, No. 4 (Fall 1988), at 869.
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registered voters and reminding them of polling times and places.
Party committees have also set up ride pools to help their voters
get to the polls. Party committees also are involved in getting their
likely voters absentee ballots if necessary.91
Generic pro-party advertisements include newspaper, radio, and
television ads that are partisan but do not mention specific candi-
dates. For example, a Democratic pro-party ad might use the
phrase "Vote Democratic" but it would not include the name or
likeness of any specific Democratic candidate. Although no candi-
date is mentioned in these ads, parties logically assume that some-
one who is motivated to vote pro-party will vote for all, or most of
the party's candidates. 2
These activities are important political weapons that directly
benefit candidates, yet they are not "direct" contributions to can-
didates, and therefore are not restricted by the contribution limits.
If the party spends its soft money on these fundamental activities,
the candidate is free to deploy his or her resources in other cam-
paign activities. In that sense, the party's soft money displaces the
candidate's hard money, and the overall effect is a significant net
gain for the candidate who received a valuable service without
spending a dime. It is debatable whether this is beneficial or detri-
mental to the state's political system.
Should the FPPC adopt a "party building theory" or a "soft
money loophole theory" in interpreting the phrase "purposes other
than making contributions directly to candidates for elective of-
fice"? Supporters of the party building theory will interpret this
phrase narrowly, allowing all support that is not a direct contribu-
tion to the candidate. This will allow political parties to spend
funds in ways that will increase their political power, and thereby
decrease the power of corporations, unions, and legislative leaders.
Supporters of the soft money loophole theory will interpret this
91. Targeting absentee ballot votes can be a critical aspect of a California election.
Traditionally, absentee ballots were used by people unable to make it to the polls
on Election Day, either because they were out of town or ill. But in the late 1970s,
during the Administration of Democratic Gov. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., legislation
passed that enabled California's registered voters to use absentee ballots for any
reason, including simple convenience.
In 1982, this legislation played a key role in a major election for the first time
when Republication George Deukmejian defeated Democrat Tom Bradley in an
extremely tight gubernatorial race. Bradley received the most votes among those
who went to the polls on Election Day, but because Republic campaign strategists
sent hundreds of thousands of absentee ballot applications to voters throughout the
state, Deukmejian won the race.
See Corwin, Modesto's Mail-in Ballot May Mark a Model Vote, Los Angeles Times, Jan.
30, 1990, at A-1, col.l.
92. For a discussion of "pro-party" ads and their impact, see FEC Advisory Opinion
1984-15, Federal Election Campaign Financing Guide (CCH) 5766 (1988).
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phrase broadly, in order to prevent the 85303(c) exception from
undercutting the contribution limits. This will prevent fat cats,
party leaders, and candidates from working together to circum-
vent the spirit of Proposition 73's contribution limits.
2. The Party Building Theory
The "party building theory" is based on the following premise:
an increase in the influence of political parties improves our elec-
toral system by decreasing the influence of narrow special inter-
ests.93 If section 85303(c) is allowed to produce healthier political
parties in California, it will actually diminish the role of private
monied interests in our electoral process. Supporters of the party
building theory believe it is better for a candidate to be dependent
upon a political party that represent a broad spectrum of voters
than upon corporations, unions, or legislative leaders that re-
present narrow special interests.
This will benefit the system because parties pick candidates
based on a wide range of issues, as opposed to corporations and
unions who pick candidates based upon narrow economic interests
or legislative leaders who pick candidates based upon personal loy-
alty. Political parties serve as intermediary organizations that are
responsive to a broad coalition of interests instead of narrow spe-
cial interests. A candidate who wins a major party nomination
must represent a broader base of support than a candidate who is
funded by a specific narrow special interest group.94
In Storer v. Brown, 5 the United States Supreme Court upheld
a California ballot requirement as constitutional and commented,
"California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that
splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant
damage to the fabric of government." 96 By expanding the role of
parties to raise and spend funds, candidates will be less dependent
upon special interest group funds and more dependent upon the
party organization.97
93. See. e.g., Malbin, Proposals for Change in the Federal Election Campaign Law,
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: READINGS ON CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 295-99, at 298.
94. In this sense, party committees are viewed as a means of winnowing out radical
or individualistic candidates who do not possess the attributes of a person who can appeal
to the diverse sub-groups within the Democratic or Republican parties.
95. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
96. Id. at 736.
97. "[T]he [California] parties are under a deadline of sorts to prove rather rapidly
that they can raise the money and form the kind of organization necessary to undertake
these [§85303(c) type] political activities, before other political-action committees com-
pletely circumvent the party .... In politics, money is the determinant of credibility as a
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The benefits that section 85303(c) can play in strengthening
California's parties was summarized in a January 3, 1989 article
by Dr. Herbert Alexander, a political science professor at the Uni-
versity of Southern California, and James S. Fay, a political sci-
ence professor at California State University, Hayward.
[B]ecause Proposition 73 imposes even greater limits on other
actors in the political arena, there may be some hope for
strengthening the parties ... candidates will have to seek money
from a broader base and thus may be forced to look to the par-
ties not only for a modicum of direct aid but, more important,
for indirect assistance.
This indirect assistance . may even work to promote the
long-term vitality of parties .... Prop. 73, though constraining
contributions to candidates, fails to prevent individuals or groups
from making unlimited contributions to political parties for indi-
rect expenditures. Hence parties, in bank accounts separated
from those supporting candidates, can collect unlimited sums
from individuals and PACs for uses that indirectly benefit
candidates.
For example, they can finance voter registration and turnout
drives, phone banks and institutional advertising .... Both par-
ties engage in some of these activities now, but they will be able
to do far more if legislative leaders and major campaign contrib-
utors decide that they can retain their influence only if the par-
ties increase theirs through such donations. 8
Advocates of stronger state parties would look forward to using
section 85303(c) funds to help party candidates. Stronger parties
would have more influence over who is chosen as a candidate and
who wins elections. Although stronger parties would not lead to
truly independent candidates, it would be an improvement to have
candidates dependent on groups that represents a broad range of
interests, as opposed to the narrow interests of particular groups.
Thus far, the FPPC appears to have adopted the party building
theory. In December of 1989, it enacted regulations that placed
certain party-sponsored voter registration and get-out-the-vote ac-
tivities clearly within the protection of section 85303(c). As long
as these activities do not specifically name the candidate (or his or
her opponent), they are not considered contributions99 and there-
fore are not subject to the contribution limits.100 Generic pro-
party ads are not specifically mentioned in these regulations, but
they would likely be permissible if utilized as part of a get-out-
the-vote drive.
98. Alexander & Fay, What the New Year Brings for Political Campaigning, Los
Angeles Herald Examiner, Jan. 3, 1989, at A-1 1, col. 1.
99. 2 CAL. CODE OF REcS. § 18215(d).
100. 2 CAL CODE OF REGS. § 18535.
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3. The Soft Money Loophole Theory
The soft money loophole theory is based on the belief that all
political money that benefits candidates, directly or indirectly,
should be within the regulatory scope of the campaign finance
laws. 1" If there is a clear paper trail between contributor and
candidate, then the public can make an informed decision as to
the credibility and independence of that candidate. Supporters of
this theory see section 85303(c) as a loophole because 85303(c)
funds are not restricted by any contribution limits. Therefore, to
the extent this soft money actually enters campaigns and influ-
ences elections, it vitiates the new contribution limitations and vio-
lates the spirit of Proposition 73.
a. Federal Soft Money
This concept can be understood by examining a federal soft
money loophole that exists in a presidential election. When a ma-
jor party presidential candidate accepts public funds for his gen-
eral election campaign, he is prohibited from taking private con-
tributions for general campaign expenses. However, a private
contributor can still move federal "soft money" into the candi-
date's campaign by donating money to a state party organization
that organizes on behalf of the presidential candidate and spends
the money (outside the scope of federal law) for activities that
benefit the candidate, including certain voter registration and get-
out-the-vote activities.102 These activities directly benefit the presi-
dential candidate because the candidate's campaign team need not
spend its money or time identifying and contacting sympathetic
voters. The party committee can use federal soft money to accom-
plish this task and the presidential campaign can spend its hard
money in other ways. This money is "soft" because contributions
of this nature to state party committees are not subject to federal
disclosure or contribution limits.'0 3 This is the case even though
the contribution may or may not be subject to state contribution
and disclosure limits.
101. The argument is that campaign finance laws are hinged on two key require-
ments: adequate disclosure of political money and limitations on the movement of that
money. If soft money is not reported or not limited, it is anathema to the essence of the
campaign laws.
102. II C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(17) (1988).
103. Since these expenses are not contributions under federal law, they are not lim-
ited by the federal contribution limits.
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b. California's New Soft Money Loophole
Under the pre-Proposition 73 laws, political operatives did not
need a soft money loophole since the state imposed no contribu-
tion limits whatsoever. In one sense, the entire law was a loophole
in comparison to federal law, which prohibited certain contribu-
tions in federal elections. However, now that California has tight-
ened up its contribution restrictions, political operatives will likely
exploit section 85303(c) to raise and spend soft money on activi-
ties that directly benefit the candidate without being "direct"
contributions.
For example, if a special interest group wanted to support a pet
legislator, it could only contribute $5,000 per fiscal year directly
to his or her campaign. However, that same group could give
$200,000 to the candidate's political party."" That party could
then spend 05 the $200,000 in that candidate's district for those
generic pro-party activities.106 A candidate for the legislature
would have a significant advantage over an opponent if his politi-
cal party identified and registered likely party voters. Conse-
quently, the candidate would have this increase of potential sup-
port without spending any of his or her own campaign funds.
Thus, section 85303(c) serves as a loophole in which this special
interest group could donate unlimited campaign funds to directly
influence an election. Even if the 85303(c) funds were donated
"independent" of the candidate, the candidate is likely to learn of,
and respect, the special interest group that infused the party with
financial strength at a critical juncture in the campaign. The big
$200,000 soft money contributor is in a position to gain undue
political influence with the "indirect" beneficiary of his largess.
The mere fact that the party committee has become an inter-
mediary does not necessarily remove the danger of the $200,000
being exchanged for a quid pro quo. The contribution limits are
designed to reduce the danger of a candidate being indebted to a
wealthy special interest. This soft money loophole violates the
spirit of the contribution limits.
104. 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18535 (a).
105. 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18535 (a)(3) and (d).
106. One restriction would be that these pro-party expenditures could not identify
the candidate or opposing candidate by name.
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IV. CLOSING THE SOFT MONEY LOOPHOLE: A PROPOSAL FOR
FUTURE FPPC REGULATIONS
A. The Benefits of Party Power
Political power and political money go hand in hand. They rise
together and fall together. The party building theory tells us that
the ascendancy of political party power includes a corresponding
decrease in the influence of corporations, unions, and legislative
leaders. The FPPC should follow this theory, but it should not
ignore the dangers highlighted by the soft money loophole theory.
The key to blending these approaches focuses on severing the un-
healthy connection between the big giver and the candidate
through a redefinition of the word "contribution."
B. Closing the Loophole by Redefining "Contribution"
The FPPC has recently redefined the word "contribution" to
include voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities that iden-
tify a specific candidate (or the opposing candidate) by name.
107
This is a positive step in closing the soft money loophole, since
85303 (c) funds now cannot be used for candidate-specific
activities.
The FPPC allows this because it believes these generic party
activites are "politically neutral" and of "only questionable benefit
to any specific candidate." 0 8 The FPPC is wrong. The activities
may be "candidate-neutral" in appearance but they are "candi-
date-friendly" in substance. These activities are not of "questiona-
ble benefit" to the candidates, they are greatly beneficial. Voters
motivated to vote Republican by these party expenditures are
likely to vote for the Republican candidate. A candidate need not
be named in a party communication in order to benefit.
Although the FPPC ruled that party committees cannot use
85303(c) funds for candidate-specific expenditures, the loophole
remains open. The FPPC should go further and prohibit a party
committee from accepting candidate-specific contributions. Cur-
rently, in order to "make" an 85303(c) contribution in excess of
the 85302 limits, a contributor needs only to give notice' 09 that
the money is to be used "for purposes other than to make contri-
butions to candidates for elective office." 110 There is nothing
107. See the recently amended 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18215 et seq.
108. FPPC Initial Statement of Reasons re Adoption of 2 Cal. Code of Regs. Sec.
18215.
109. 2 CAL. CODE OF REGS. § 18535 (c)(2).
110. The political party can meet the notice requirement by including a statement in
the initial solicitation that "a specified portion of the contribution will be used for purposes
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prohibiting that contributor from directing the party to use those
funds to make candidate-neutral expenditures for voter registra-
tion, get-out-the-vote, and generic ads in that specific legislative
district.
The FPPC should redefine the term "contribution" to include
money given to a political party that is earmarked by the giver to
be spent by the party for a specific candidate or district.
This would mean that a party that spends earmarked funds in the
targeted race will be making a contribution to the targeted candi-
date. Since 85303(c) funds cannot be used to make contributions,
the party will not be able to receive earmarked funds under
85303(c). The party could still receive earmarked funds from con-
tributors under Section 85302, but only in amounts of $2,500.00
or less per fiscal year limit.
This scheme would prohibit the party from serving as a simple
conduit between fat cat and candidate. The danger of a candidate
trading a favor for a soft money contribution is diminished be-
cause the direct connection between the contributor and the candi-
date is cut off and diffused by the party organization.
This redefinition of the word contribution follows the party
building theory in that it does not prohibit the party from receiv-
ing unlimited non-earmarked 85303(c) funds. Contributors who
truly want to enhance the influence of the political parties can still
make unlimited non-earmarked 85303(c) contributions and those
funds can be distributed statewide. This redefinition also is in har-
mony with the soft money loophole theory because it eliminates
the opportunity for a big contributor to use 85303(c) as a means
of channeling soft money around the contribution limits to a can-
didate in exchange for a quid pro quo.
CONCLUSION
The California reformers who initiated Proposition 73 and the
California reformers who voted for it should be commended for
improving the state's campaign finance laws. If Section 85303(c)
leads to a rise in the power of the political parties, the state's elec-
toral system will benefit. Political parties should be allowed to
spend unlimited amounts of money in their attempts to persuade
citizens to participate in our democracy. The state's public policy
should be to encourage programs that increase voter participation,
not to discourage such programs.
However, section 85303(c) still presents contributors with an




California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss2/8
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
opportunity to circumvent the newly enacted contribution limits.
Attempting to control the flow of campaign money is similar to
attempting to control the flow of a mountain river; at one point
you may block its path, but it will merely keep moving and groove
a new path to its goal. Political operatives have been resourceful
and ingenious in finding ways to get around laws and regulations.
As long as mortal men and women are influenced by the power
that flows with money, there will be other men and women who
will find creative ways to raise and distribute that money in an
attempt to influence our governing process.
The FPPC can close the soft money loophole by prohibiting the
receipt and expenditure of certain earmarked funds in excess of
the contribution limits. However, the FPPC should not become so
concerned with potential soft money abuses that it restricts the
use of section 85303(c) funds for other party building activities.
These activities will enhance, not hurt, the integrity of California's
electoral process.
Bill Baber*
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